

(6) Fiscal year 1990 will constitute the fifth consecutive fiscal year for which the amount appropriated for national defense functions of the Government declined (after adjusting for inflation) from the preceding fiscal year.

(7) Expected limitations on future defense budgets make it essential that the Nation's defense priorities be carefully analyzed so as to properly fund the Armed Forces, including the various elements of the Nation's strategic forces.

(b) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—In light of the findings in subsection (a), it is the sense of Congress that—

(8) it is not prudent or possible at this time to commit to a production rate for the B-2 aircraft higher than the rate under the low-rate initial production plan:

(9) the contingent authorization of funds in this Act for the low-rate initial production of two additional B-2 aircraft does not constitute a commitment to support the procurement of large numbers of B-2 aircraft, to provide funding in subsequent years for rate production of B-2 aircraft, or to approve a multiyear procurement of B-2 aircraft; and

(10) before a commitment is made to proceed with initial full-rate production of the B-2 aircraft, the President and Congress should carefully consider (based upon the assumption of a START regime that uses the Revkivak counting rule for bombers, upon the assumption of a START regime that uses alternative rules for counting bombers, and upon the assumption of no START treaty) the desirability and feasibility of—

(11) structuring the strategic bomber force of the United States in such a manner that primary reliance would be placed upon bombers carrying cruise missiles rather than bombers having strictly a penetrating role; and

(12) pursuing options for the procurement of significantly fewer than 132 B-2 aircraft so that, if a decision is made in the future to procure an operational force of B-2 aircraft, the total acquisition and life-cycle cost of the B-2 aircraft program would be reduced.

PART C—OTHER STRATEGIC PROGRAMS

SEC. 121. LIMITATIONS ON B-1B ELECTRONIC COUNTERMEASURES RECOVERY PROGRAM

(13) GENERAL LIMITATION.—The Secretary of the Air Force may proceed with the recovery program for the B-1B aircraft electronic countermeasures (ECM) system only in accordance with this section.

(14) REQUIREMENT FOR TESTING PROGRAM.—(1) During fiscal years 1990 and 1991, the Secretary of Defense shall conduct a comprehensive program for the systematic testing of the B-1B avionics modifications.

(2) For purposes of this section, the term "B-1B avionics modifications" means the modifications proposed by the Air Force to the defensive avionics system of the B-1B aircraft consisting of (A) the "core configuration" modification to the ALO-161 system, plus (B) the installation and integration of a radar warning

receiver.
Reports (3) Not later than 60 days after the date of the
enactment of this
Act, the Secretary shall submit to the congressional defense commit-
tees a detailed plan for the conduct of the systematic testing